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NOTES
Labor Law—Preemption—Lodge 76, International Association
of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission
(Kearney)'—During negotiations for a renewed collective bargaining
agreement, 2 petitioner, Lodge 76, International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the Union) and respondent,
Kearney and Trecker Corporation (the Company), reached a bargain-
ing impasse concerning the workday and workweek provisions to be
included in the new agreement.a When the Company unilaterally an-
nounced plans to implement its proposal for changes in the workday
and workweek provisions with corresponding changes in the hours
constituting overtime work, the Union adopted a resolution, effective
immediately, binding its members to refuse to work any overtime. 4
The Company did not implement its proposed changes before the
new agreement became effective, but the Union continued the over-
time ban with virtually total employee compliance. 8
The Company did not discipline employees who complied with
the Union resolution, but instead, while negotiations continued, filed
a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the
Board) that the Union's overtime ban violated section 8(b)(3)° of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 7 The Regional Director found
no violation of the NLRA and dismissed the charge on the ground
that the union conduct was not cognizable by the Board. 8
The Company also filed a complaint before the respondent Wis-
consin Employment Relations Commission (the Commission) charging
that the refusal to work overtime constituted an unfair labor practice
under state law.9 Rejecting the Union's challenge to its jurisdiction,
the Commission concluded that it was not preempted from regulating
the Union's conduct. The Commission applied "the primary jurisdic-
I 427 U.S. 132 (1976),
2 The previous agreement terminated pursuant to its terms on June 19, 1971. A
new agreement became effective on July 23, 1972. Id. at 134.
For the prior 17 years, the basic workday had been 7Y2 hours, and the work-
week, 371/2 hours. The Company demanded that the workday he changed to eight
hours, and the workweek to 40 hours, and that the terms on which overtime rates of
pay were payable be changed accordingly. The Union opposed such changes. Id.
Overtime was defined under the old contract as work in excess of 7ki hours in
a day or 371/2 hours in a week. Id. The parties disagreed as to whether overtime at the
Company was voluntary or mandatory. See note 102 infra.
' 427 U.S. at 134-35.
°Section 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees ...."
29 U.S.C. §§ 151 el seq. (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(1974),
° 427 U.S. at 135.
° See note 12 infra.
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Lion of the NLRB" preemption approach" and concluded that the
overtime ban was neither "arguably protected" nor "arguably
prohibited"" by the NLRA. Therefore, according to the Commission,
preemption was not required. On the merits, the Commission deter-
mined that the concerted refusal to work overtime constituted an un-
fair labor practice under Wisconsin law," and ordered the Union to
"cease and desist from authorizing, encouraging or condoning any
concerted refusal to accept overtime assignments ...."' 3 The Wiscon-
sin Circuit Court affirmed and entered judgment enforcing the
Commission's order. This decision, in turn, was affirmed by the Wis-
consin Supreme Court."
The Union sought certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court, claiming that federal policy preempted the Commission's exer-
cise of its regulatory authority in this case. The Supreme Court
granted certioriari, reversed the state court determination and HELD:
State regulation of the Union's peaceful concerted refusal to work
overtime is impermissible because such regulation would frustrate the
'° This approach preempts slate regulation of conduct arguably subject to federal
labor law; see text at note 50 infra.
" Economic pressure tactics in labor disputes are classified as either "protected,"
"prohibited," or federally unregulated. Union conduct is "protected" if' it falls under the
protections of § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), which provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
have the right to refrain from any or all such activities ....
Union or employer conduct is prohibited if defined as an unfair labor practice under §
8 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158 (1970). Section 8(a)(1), for example, declares that it is
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ...." The Act, however,
does not preclude the employer from engaging in certain limited economic counter-
measures even where employee activity is protected under 7. For example, an em-
ployer may replace striking employees, NLRB v. Mackay Radio Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333,
345 (1938), Similarly, in some circumstances an employer may resort to lockouts as a
form of bargaining pressure on unions. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300, 318 (1965).
On the other hand, where employee conduct is not protected, employers may re-
sort to discipline, discharge and other strong countermeasures without violating section
8. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Intl Union, 361 U.S. 477. 492-94 (1961). See
generally, Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer — "Protected"
Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. Rev. 378, 379-92 (1969).
" The Commission found that the overtime bah constituted proscribed activity
under %%Its, STAT. ANN. § 1 11.06(2) (1974) (West) which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in con-
cert with others:
(h) To take unauthorized possession of property of the employer or
to engage in any concerted effort to interfere with production except by
leaving the premises in an orderly manner for the purpose of going on
strike.
" 427 U.S. at 136. The Commission's decision is unreported.
" 67 Wis. 2d 13, 26, 226 N.W.2d 203, 209, 88 L.R.R.M. 3340, 3345 (1975). The
opinion of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County is unreported.
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intent of Congress to leave such activity, neither protected nor prohib-
ited under federal law, controlled only by the free play of contend-
ing economic forces." In so holding, the Court expressly overruled
the so -called Briggs-Stratton case, Automobile Workers Local 232 v. Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board," which permitted state regulation of
partial strike activity,' 7
 as "no longer of general application." 1 °
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority," analyzed the
Commission's regulation of the Union's refusal to work overtime in
light of earlier cases20
 in which the Court preempted state regulation
of certain economic tactics which were neither protected nor prohib-
ited by the NLRA. 2 ' Those cases, the Court stated, established that
the states do not have jurisdiction to proscribe the use of a particular
economic weapon where it is inferable that Congress intended to leave
the weapon available as part of the federal balance between the "'un-
controlled power of management and labor to further their respective
15
 427 U.S. at 155.
'" 336 U.S. 245 (1949). In Briggs
-Stratton, while collective bargaining was in pro-
gress, employees called twenty-six unannounced and irregularly scheduled meetings
during working hours in order to exert bargaining pressure on the employer. Id. at
249. The Court upheld an order by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, which
was construed and upheld by the State Supreme Court, forbidding a concerted effort to
interfere with production by those methods. Id. at 250, 265. The United States Su-
preme Court examined the Union conduct and found it neither protected not prohibited
under the NLRA, and concluded that there was "no basis for denying to Wisconsin the
power, in governing her internal affairs, to regulate" such activity. Id. at 269. It deter-
mined that such conduct was "governable by the states or it was entirely ungoverned."
Id. at 254.
' 7
 The term "partial strike activity" refers to various kinds of union pressure tac-
tics short of a full strike. It includes slowdowns, see Raleigh Water Heater Mfg. Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 76, 79, 80, 49 L.R.R.M. 1708, 1709 (1962), on the job harassment tactics, see
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1960), refusals to work
overtime and other conduct of a similar nature.
The NLRB has held such tactics unprotected because the unions utilizing them
exert economic pressure on the employer without taking the risks of replacement and
loss of pay inherent in a full strike: "Employees who choose to withhold their services
because of a dispute over scheduled hours may properly be required to do so by strik-
ing unequivocally. They may not simultaneously walk off their jobs but retain the ben-
efits of working." First National Bank, 171 N.LR.B. 1145, 1151, 69 L.R.R.M. 1103,
1104 (1968), enforced, 413 F.2d 921, 926, 71 L.R.R.M. 3019, 3022 (8th Cir. 1969).
A related reason for holding a refusal to work overtime unprotected is that it
constitutes an attempt by employees to work on terms of their own choosing. See John
S. Swift Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 394, 397, 44 L.R.R.M. 1388, 1390 (1959), modified and
enforced, 277 F.2d. 641, 646-47, 46 L.R.R.M. 2090, 2094 (7th Cir. 1960), Valley City
Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589, 1595, 35 L.R.R.M. 1265, 1266 (1954).
1" 427 U.S. at 151. The instant case did not overrrule Briggs on its facts since in
Briggs, overtones of violence were involved. Id. at 151 n. 13.
Justices Marshall, White, Powell, Blackman and Chief Justice Burger joined in
the opinion but Justice Powell, in his concurrence in which the Chief Justice joined,
conditioned his agreement on the understanding that the Court's approach would not
preempt "neutral" state law. See text at note 148 infra. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent-
ing opinion in which Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined.
2" Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964); Garner v.
Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 499.500 (1953).
" See text at notes 52-96 infra.	 -
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interests'." 22 In accordance with its approach to the instant case, the
Court formulated the "crucial inquiry regarding preemption" as
"whether 'the exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely
prohibit self-help would frustrate effective implementation of the
Act's processes. -23 Applying this inquiry to the Kearney facts the
Court determined that, even if the refusal to work overtime was as-
sumed to be neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA, state law
was preempted from restraining such activity because any such re-
straint would frustrate Congress' intent to leave union refusals to
work overtime available as part of the labor balance struck by federal
law." The Court further reasoned that permitting such state regula-
tion would allow the state to influence the substantive outcome of
negotiations, contrary to federal policy which seeks to allow parties to
bargain freely."
Having set forth its view of federal labor policy, the Court over-
ruled the Briggs decision as inconsistent with that policy to the extent
that it held that states could regulate peaceful partial strike activity."
Moreover, in view of its disposition of the case on the ground that
Congress intended to allow unions to engage in concerted refusals to
work overtime, the Court found the "primary jurisdiction of the
NLRB" approach to preemption," which preempts state regulation of
conduct arguably subject to federal regulation, to be "largely inappli-
cable to the circumstances of this case." 2 "
The significance of the Kearney decision lies in the Court's ex-
press adoption of a "permitted activities" preemption inquiry based on
the premise that Congress generally intended to leave federally un-
prohibited, peaceful self-help available as an integral part of the col-
lective bargaining process. Earlier cases 2 " had preempted state regula-
tion of particular economic pressure tactics. However, preemption ar-
guably was only invoked where the Court could infer preemptive con-
gressional intent from evidence that Congress in fact had considered
such activity and affirmatively decided to allow a union to engage in
it." Briggs-Stratton"' was consistent with this narrow view of congres-
sionally unregulated labor combat to the extent that Briggs stood for
the proposition that certain forms of federally unregulated self-help,
22 427 U.S. at 196, quoting Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252,
259 (1969),
" 427 U.S. at 147-48, quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969).
24 427 U.S. at 149-50.
28
 Id at 149.
"Id. at 15 1 .
" Sec text at notes 40-50 infra,
28
 427 U.S. at 155.
2" See note 20 supra.
" See 427 U.S. at 157 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Local 20, Teamsters Union v.
Morton, '377 U.S. 252, 258 -59. See also Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1352 (1972). See text at notes 77-96 infra.
3 ' 236 U.S. 245, 254 (1949).
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such as partial strike activity, were left by Congress to state regulation.
In overruling Briggs and rejecting the arguably restrictive implications
of the earlier "permitted activities" preemption cases, the Court in
Kearney has invoked a potentially broad preemption approach which
seeks to prevent a "frustration of the Act's processes" caused by state
interference with the federal labor balance, and which does not de-
pend on a finding of particularized congressional intent to allow a
given activity. The potentially broad application of this approach also
appears to leave the future role of the "primary jurisdiction" preemp-
tion inquiry somewhat uncertain.
After a brief introduction to the issue of preemption in labor
law, this casenote initially will examine the state of labor law preemp-
tion prior to Kearney. In examining the pre-Kearney preemption cases,
the note will first focus on the "primary jurisdiction of the NLRB"
preemption approach, and then will analyze the "permitted activities"
preemption cases. Having considered these two lines of preemption
inquiry, the note will turn to Kearney and will analyze its significance
for the "permitted activities" preemption inquiry as well as its broader
implications for the future of labor law preemption.
I. LABOR LAW PREEMPTION PRIOR TO KEARNEY
The question of the role of state law in regulating labor
relations32
 has arisen frequently since the enactment of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 33
 While a number of the Act's provi-
sions deal with the role of state law,34
 there are no clear statutory
standards for determining whether the NLRA preempts state law in a
given set of circumstances. The Supreme Court, however, has formu-
lated its own criteria, based on its understanding of congressional
purpose in enacting the NLRA, for the preemption of state law.
Thus, the Court early established that the states are preempted from
regulating conduct which is protected by section 7 of the Act. 35 The
" The question of the role of state labor law arises where a given business has a
sufficient link to interstate commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional standards of the
NLRB. NLRB Press Release No. R. 576, Oct. 2, 1958, cited in Cox, Labor Law Preemption
Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv, 1337, 1338 n.5 (1972).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970), as amended by Pub, L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(1974).
"See, e.g., § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970) (by agreement with a state agency,
the Board may cede jurisdiction to such agency); § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970) (state
mediatory or conciliatory agencies must be notified before a party may terminate or
modify an existing collective bargaining agreement); § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970)
(the Act not to be construed as authorizing agreements requiring union membership as
a condition of employment where such agreements are prohibited by state law); §
14(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1970) (the Act does not bar states from asserting juris-
diction over labor disputes over which the Board declines to assert jurisdiction because
of insufficient effect on interstate commerce).
" Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 459 (1950); Hill v. Florida ex
re/. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 542, 543 (1945). Section 7, 29 U.S,C. § 157 (1970) is set forth
in pertinent part in note 11 supra.
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Court also established that the preemption of state regulation of
peaceful economic activity which is prohibited under section 839 was
necessary to avoid potential conflict of substantive law, procedures
and remedies." In addition to delineating these guiding principles,
the Court was concerned with the practical problems involved in their
application. Since state courts are self-policing with respect to their
jurisdiction to hear cases arising out of labor disputes, the Court rec-
ognized the need for a rule which would facilitate such jurisdictional
determinations." At the same time, the Court was concerned that the
states, pursuant to the exercise of jurisdiction, might make determina-
tions with regard to federal labor policy which would conflict with
that policy as implemented by the NLRB. 39 The confluence of these
general principles and practical concerns gave rise to the "primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB" approach to preemption.
A. The "Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB" Approach to Preemption
The Supreme Court first formulated the "primary jurisdiction of
the NLRB" preemption approach in San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon. 40 In Garman, a anion which had not been selected as bar-
gaining representative of the employees sought an agreement with a
company under which the company would retain in its employ only
those employees who were union members or who applied for union
membership within thirty days." When the company refused to agree
to these terms, the union peacefully picketed the employer's place of
business and also attempted to persuade customers of the company to
cease doing business with it until the employer agreed to the union's
terms." The employer sought relief' in state court on the ground that
the union was attempting to compel the company to discriminate
against non-union employees. At the same time the company began
a representation proceeding before the NLRB, which declined
jurisdiction." The state court, however, asserted jurisdiction, finding
that the union's picketing and other activities constituted an unfair
labor practice under state law," and awarding damages for the
" 29 U.S.C. * 158 (1970). Portions of section 8 are set forth at notes 64 and 70
infra.
"Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488-89, 491 (1953).
" See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 290
(1971).
"Id. ai 289.
4" 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
" Id. at 237,
12 Id .
43
 "The regional Director declined jurisdiction, presumably because the amount
of interstate commerce involved did not meet the Board's monetary standards in taking
jurisdiction." Id, at '238.
"Gannon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 609, 320 P,2d
473, 481, 41 L.R.11,M, 2496, 2503 (1958).
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company's losses. 48
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the state court was.
preempted from awarding damages both because the union conduct
was "arguably prohibited" under the NLRA, 46 and because the state
regulation of such federally regulated conduct would interfere with
the implementation of federal policy. The Court reasoned that to
allow states to remedy injuries caused by conduct which is clearly pro-
tected or clearly prohibited under federal law would create potential
conflict of substantive law, remedy and procedure between state and
federal regulation.'" Moreover, the Court noted that there were cases
in which it was not clear whether the conduct which the states sought
to regulate was protected by section 7, prohibited by section 8, or not
regulated by either of those sections. 48 The Court reasoned that in
such cases, the administration of the NLRA required that the deter-
mination of whether conduct was federally protected or prohibited
"be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board." 48
Thus, the Court formulated the "primary jurisdiction" rule for
preempting state law: "When an activity is arguably subject to §7 or §8
of the [NLRA), the States ... must defer to the exclusive competence
of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interfer-
ence with national policy is to be averted."50
as
	
at 614, 320 P.2d at 485, 41 L.R.R.M. at 2506. For the earlier procedural
history of the case see Carmen, 359 U.S. at 238-39.
" 359 U.S. at 246.
47 Id. at 244.
"Id. at 244-45.
4 II id .
5" Id. at 245. While the "primary jurisdiction of the NLRB" approach provided a
preemption rule "capable of relatively easy application," Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 290 (1970), it has not been applied in every case
in which state jurisdiction has been at issue. The Court in some circumstances has al-
lowed state regulation while refraining from an inquiry into the arguably protected or
prohibited nature of the conduct regulated. For example, the court, reasoning that the
states have a compelling local interest in restraining violent activity, has declined to
preempt states from policing violent conduct arising out of labor disputes even where
the conduct was federally prohibited. Garman, 359 U.S. 236, 247. International Union
of Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958); Younjdahl v. Rainfair Inc.,
355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957); United Constr. Workers v. Lzbrunum Constr. Corp., 347
U.S. 656, 669 (1954). Similarly, the Court has not preempted state regulation of argu-
ably protected or prohibited conduct where it has found the conduct to be of only
"peripheral concern" to the policy underlying the NLRA. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S,
171, 180-81 (1967) (stale court jurisdiction over suits alleging breaches of the union
duty of lair representation is not preempted because, inter cilia, such suits involve issues
not usually within the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction); Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966) (a state remedy for malicious libel
arising out of a labor dispute would not impinge upon the policy of the NLRA); Hanna
Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 192-93 (1965)
(even if supervisory union picketing constituted an arguable unfair labor practice,
supervisors are outside the central focus of the Act's concern and state law was not
preempted); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619.23 (1958)
(a state court was not preempted from ordering a union to reinstate and award dam-
ages to a wrongfully expelled member even though the union conduct might involve an
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Subsequent to Gannon, the Court developed another important
rationale for the preemption of state law. In Kearney and one earlier
case,51
 the Court determined that union tactics clearly unprohibited
by section 8 were in fact intended by Congress to be free of all gov-
ernmental regulation; accordingly, the Court held that allowing state
law to regulate such tactics would be inconsistent with federal policy.
The Court in those cases found it unnecessary to inquire whether the
conduct involved was "arguably protected" by section 7, since even if
the conduct were in fact unprotected, the state would have no juris-
diction to proscribe it because Congress intended that it remain free
of all governmental prohibition. The next section of this note will
focus on those cases in which preemption was based on the Court's in-
ference of congressional intent to leave some forms of self-help gov-
ernmentally unregulated so as to be controlled only by the free play
of the economic power of unions and management.
B. The "Permitted Activities" Line of Preemption Inquiry Prior to Kearney
One of the Court's earliest attempts to interpret the impact of
the Taft-Hartley amendments 52 on the role of state labor regulation
was the so
-called Briggs-Stratton case, Automobile Workers Local 232 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board. 53 In Briggs-Stratton the Court
held that a state labor board had jurisdiction to enjoin a union from
calling intermittent, unannounced meetings during working hours as
a means of exerting bargaining pressure on the employer. 54 The
Court reasoned that. this "coercive" activity remained subject to state
control in the absence of a clear manifestation of congressional intent
to exclude states from exercising their police power.as Furthermore,
the Court assumed that such a manifestation of preemptive congres-
sional intent would be present only where the federal Act protected
or prohibited the conduct which the state sought to regulate." Since
the Court in Briggs found that the union tactics were neither pro-
tected nor prohibited under the NLRA," it concluded that there was
"no basis for denying to Wisconsin the power" to regulate such
conduct. 5 B
unfair labor practice, since such internal union affairs were of only peripheral concern
to the policy of the NLRA).
" Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1964).
52
 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 101, ch. 120, 61
Stat, 136 (1947), (codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-58, 159-68, 171-82, 185-87,
191-97),
53
	U.S. 245 (1949).
" Id. at 265.
55
-/d. at 253.
50 1d. at 252-5:3.
" Id. at 252-54.
5"
 Id. at 256. The dissenting opinions in Briggs did not dispute the premise that
the sole issue involved was whether the union's calling of unannounced meetings dur-
ing working hours constituted federally protected activity, but dissented only from the
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In subsequent cases, however, the Court departed from the
Briggs assumption and inferred that federal policy required the
preemption of state regulation of certain activities which were not sub-
ject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776 59
provided the first indication that federal labor policy might preempt
state regulation of conduct neither protected nor prohibited under
the NLRA. In Garner, a local union picketed a trucking concern in
support of a demand for recognition and a closed shop." The com-
pany did not file a charge with the NLRB, but sued in state court for
an injunction against the union's alleged attempt to coerce the com-
pany to discriminate against nonunion employees." A lower state
court granted the injunction," but the Supreme Court held the state
court preempted because its injunction created a danger of conflict
with federal labor policy." The Court reasoned that the union's pick-
eting would constitute an unfair labor practice under NLRA section
8(13)(2)" 4 if the employer's allegations were true, and that Congress in-
tended the NLRA procedures for proscribing such conduct to be
exclusive." Moreover, the Court suggested that even if the Board
found that the union's picketing did not constitute an unfair labor
practice and dismissed the complaint, that dismissal effectively would
sanction the picketing so as to preclude state regulation:
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of
specified types of picketing would seem to imply that other
picketing is to be free of other methods and sources of re-
straint. For the policy of the Labor Management Relations
Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascer-
tained by its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibi-
tions. Otherwise, it is implicit in the Act that the public in-
terest is served by freedom of labor to use the weapon of
picketing. For a state to impinge on the area of labor com-
bat designed to be free is quite as much an obstruction of
Court's conclusion that the union's tactic was federally unprotected. Id. at 268 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); id. at 270 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
" 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
4" Id. at 487. Four of the company's 24 employees were members of the union.
Id. at 486. The company's business fell off drastically when drivers for other carriers re-
fused to cross the picket lines. Id. at 487.
"'Id. at 487.
62 62 Dauphin County Rep. 339, 361, 30 L.R.R.M. '2379, 2391, (C. P. 1951). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently reversed. 373 Pa. 19, 30, 94 A.2d 893, 899,
31 L.R.R.M. 2392, 2396 (1953). This later decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
346 U.S. at 501.
" 346 U.S. at 490-91, 501.
" Section 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for a union "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (8] (a)(3) ...." Subsection 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (1970), provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer by dis-
crimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ...."
" 346 U.S. at 488-89.
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federal policy as if the state were to declare picketing free
for purposes or by methods which the federal Act
prohibits."
Thus, Garner articulated the concept that there is an area of
labor combat intended to be free of governmental regulation." While
the Court in Garner inferred only that certain forms of picketing were
permitted, its implications arguably extended to other forms of
economic combat. The section 8 "procedure for restraint of specified
types of picketing" referred to in Garner was not in fact prescribed for
the regulation of certain types of picketing 88 per se; rather, its purpose
was the proscription of any form of union economic combat when en-
gaged in for unlawful ends." Thus, section 8(b) prohibits in general
language union conduct which constrains employees in the exercise
of their rights" or which causes certain forms of employer
discrimination. 7 t It likewise prohibits unions from engaging in, or in-
ducting or encouraging employees to engage in certain types of sec-
ondary boycott activity and other specified forms of coercive
conduct." While section 8(b) evinced congressional concern with the
illegal purpose or results of prohibited union self-help, it did not
evince concern with the particular form which prohibited self-help
took. It was inferable, therefore, that section 8(b) could be applied to
proscribe any form of union economic conduct, including partial
strike activity, provided that the effect or purpose of such conduct is
illegal.'" Thus, by analogy to the Court's language in Garner, "[Ole
"" Id, at 499-500.
67/d. at 500.
"However, § 8(6)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970), which Congress added in
1959, proscribes certain kinds of recognitional picketing.
"See Briggs -Stratton, 336 U.S. at 253.
7" Section 8(h)(1), 29 U.S.C.	 158(b)(1) (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agents "to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7 ... or (B) an employer in the selection of his representa-
tives for the purposes of collective bargaining ...."
71 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970). Section 8(b)(2) is quoted, in pertinent part, in
note 64 stil/ra.
72 Section 8(6)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(h)(4) (1970).
should be noted that the Board has in fact found partial strike activity
prohibited when engaged in for unlawful goals. NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers,
309 F.2d 31, 42, 51 L.R.R.M. '2093, 2101 (9111 Cir. 1962), cert. denied. 372 U.S. 943
(1963). In Lithographers - , the Ninth Circuit held that a union strike and overtime ban
constituted unfair labor practices under *§ 8(b)(3) and 8(b)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. **
1 58(b)(3), h(4)(A) (1970), since one of the objects of such activity was the inclusion in
the collective bargaining agreement of a "hot cargo" clause and other clauses violating §
8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). 309 F.2d at 42-43, 52 L.R.R.M. at 2101. (The court dis-
tinguished NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Intl Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), see note III
infra, since there were no unlawful contract clauses involved in that case. 309 F.2d at 42
n.18, 51 L,R.R.M. at 2101 n.18).
Similarly, in Local P-575, Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 188 N.L,R.B. 5, 6, 76
L.R.R.M. 1273, 1274-75 (1971), the Board held that the employees of a neutral em-
ployer violated § 8(11)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(B) (1970), which prohibits strikes for
a secondary object. by engaging in a refusal to work overtime in an attempt to coerce
the neutral employer to stop processing the products of a primary employer.
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detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types of
[partial strike activity] would seem to imply that other [partial strike
activity] is to be free of other methods and sources of restraint."'" Al-
though the Garner rationale thus seemed to imply the permissibility of
partial strike activity undertaken for lawful purposes, there was an in-
dication that the Garner holding was intended to be more limited in
scope; Garner reaffirmed Briggs, distinguishing it on the grounds that
it involved "injurious conduct which the National Labor Relations
Board is without express power to prevent." 78 Nevertheless, the Court
in Garner modified the Briggs assumption that an inference of con-
gressional intent to preempt state law could be drawn only where the
conduct in question was either protected or prohibited by the
NLRA. 76
 Instead, Garner clearly suggested that the Court might find
conduct unregulable by the states precisely because the Board lacked
the power to prohibit such conduct.
Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton" was the only case prior to
Kearney in which the Court squarely held state regulation of union
self-help preempted on the grounds that Congress intended to leave
the conduct in question free of all governmental interference. 78 In
Morton, a striking union appealed directly to the management of one
of the company's customers to cease its business relationship with the
company for the duration of the strike. 79 Seeking damages for the al-
74 346 U.S. at 499.
75 Id. at 488. The Court drew this distinction in the context of the finding that
the NLRB had jurisdiction to hear and remedy the kind of complaint invoked in
Garner. Id.
7fl See text at note 56 supra.
77 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
"'" In Hanna Mining v. District 2. Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass . n, 382 U.S. 181
(1965) the Court rejected a supervisory union's argument for preemption based on a
permitted activities rationale. There the union engaged in recognilional picketing and
secondary activity. The Garman preemption rationale was found inapplicable because
the union's recognitional picketing was not arguably prohibited conduct under § 8(b)(7),
29 U.S.C. § 158(13)(7), since the Act's definition of "employees" excluded supervisors.
382 U.S. at 188-89. See § 2(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
Relying on its interpretation of	 2(3) as well as § 14(a), 29 U.S.C.	 164(a)
(1970), the union nevertheless argued that state regulation was preempted because
Congress intended to leave such activities of the supervisors free of all regulation. 382
U.S. at 188. The Court, however, examined the legislative history of these sections and
found no expression of intent to exclude state limitations on supervisory union organiz-
ing. Id. at 189-90.
T" 377 U.S. at 255. The union also encouraged employees of other neutral em-
ployers to compel those employers to cease doing business with the company while the
strike continued. Id. at 253. The federal district court awarded damages under section
303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970), for coer-
cion of the neutral employers through the medium of their employees. Morton v. Local
20, Teamsters, 200 F. Stipp. 653, 661, 659, 49 L.R.R.M. 2381, 2387, 2385 (N.D. Ohio
1961). Section 303(a), 29 U.S.C. § I87(a) (1970), makes it unlawful for a labor organiza-
tion to engage in activities which section 8(3)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(13)(4) (1970), defines as
unfair labor practices. Section 303(b), 29 U.S,C. 187(h) (1970), gives parties injured in
their business or property by violations of § 303(a) the right to sue for damages in fed-
eral district court or any other court with jurisdiction over the parties.
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leged union violations of federal and state laws of secondary boycott,""
the company sued in federal district court. The court held that while
the direct persuasion of neutral employers did not contravene section
303 of the LMRA," it did violate the Ohio common law of secondary
boycotts. 82 The district court. accordingly awarded damages under
state law for the direct persuasion of the neutral employer." The
Supreme Court reversed and held that an award of damages under
state law would frustrate the intent of Congress to allow employees
directly to persuade secondary employers to boycott a primary
employer." Indicating that federal policy preempted state law from
prohibiting such direct persuasion even if it were assumed to be fed-
erally unprotected, 85 the Court in Morton did not reach the "primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB" inquiry as to whether the secondary per-
suasion constituted arguably protected conduct.""
The Court in Morton based its conclusion that Congress intended
to preempt state regulation of direct secondary persuasion on its de-
termination that Congress, in enacting section 303 "dealt with particu-
larity" with secondary boycott activity, yet omitted any prohibition on
the conduct in question. 87 The Court reasoned that in forbidding cer-
tain forms of secondary activity federal labor policy struck a balance
between prohibited and permitted secondary boycotts, and that addi-
tional state restraints on secondary boycotts would disrupt this
balance." Accordingly, the Court concluded that Congress had closed
the field to the application of state law to proscribe federally
unprohibited secondary boycotts." In concluding that Congress in-
tended to "permit" direct secondary persuasion, the Morton opinion
appeared to imply that it was relying on the legislative history of the
"" Morton v. Local 20, Teamsters, 200 F. Stipp. 653, 656, 49 L.R.R.M. 2381,
2382-83 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
"' 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970): see note 79 supra.
"2 200 F. Stipp. at 656, 659, 661, 49 L.R.R.M. at 2382-83, 2387 and cases cited
therein. See 377 U.S. at '255.
"2 200 F. Stipp. at 661. 49 L.R,R,M. at 2387. See 377 U.S. at '255.
" 377 U.S. at 259-60.
" Id. at 258-60,
" See id. at 258.
"2 The Court stated:
Section 303(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act expressly au-
thorizes state and federal courts to award damages to any person injured
by certain secondary boycott activities described in § 303(a). The type of
conduct to he made the subject of a private damage action was considered
by Congress, and § 303(a) comprehensively and with great particularity
'describes and condemns specific union conduct directed to specific objec-
tives.' In selecting which forms of economic pressure should he prohibited
by § 303, Congress struck the 'balance ... between the uncontrolled power
of management and labor to further their respective interests •
Id. at 258-59, quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100
(1958) (footnotes and citation omitted).
" 377 U.S. at 258-59.
"Id. at '260.
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Taft-Hartley amendments. 9 " However, an examination of this legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress in considering section 303 was not
in fact concerned with the direct persuasion of secondary employers. 9 '
It appears, therefore, that there was no evidence in the legislative his-
tory or in the -statute that Congress affirmatively intended to permit
the direct persuasion of' secondary employers. 92
Since neither the statutory wording nor the legislative history of
section 303 support a finding of specific congressional intent to allow
direct action against secondary employers, it appears that the real
basis for the Morton Court's inference of thepermissibility of secon-
dary persuasion was a general conception of federal labor policy de-
veloped in earlier cases. To support its view that state regulation of
"" The Court noted, for example, that "[t]he type of conduct to be made the sub-
ject of a private damage action was considered by Congress ...." 377 U.S. at 258. Simi-
larly, the Court indicated its unwillingness to apply the Ohio law of secondary boycott
"to proscribe the same type of conduct which Congress focused upon but did not proscribe
when it enacted § 303 . ." Id. at 259-60 (emphasis added).
However, the Court did not cite the legislative history in support of its holding
that a court is not free to apply state law in awarding compensatory damages for union
secondary activities. This omission is all the more significant in light of Morton's
subsequent specific citation of the legislative history of § 303 to support its conclusion
that the federal court could not award putiiiitre damages under state law for the direct
persuasion of neutral employers. Id. at 260, 260 n.16.
" None of the proposed House or Senate bills included a prohibition or any
other mention of direct secondary persuasion. See, e.g., H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947) as reported in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY or CUE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Act ., 1947 [hereinafter cited as Legislative History] 42 (1948) (definition of
"illegal boycott"); H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), (as passed House), reported in
LEGist.ivrivE H 'STORY snpra at 168-69 (definition of "illegal boycott"); H.R. 3020 (as pas-
sed Senate), reported in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY supra at 240 (draft of § 8(b)(4)). Further-
more, the committee reports in discussing the ramifications of the amendment's secon-
dary boycott provisions did not refer to the status of direct secondary persuasion. See,
e.g., HOUSE CONF. REP. No. 510, ON H.R. 3020, reported in LEGISLATIVE Hts.roitv stikra at
547.
" 2
 The Court, however, might have established an intent to allow direct secon-
dary persuasion on the basis of the wording and legislative history of § 8(b)(4)(B) and §
303(a) as amended in 1959. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(Landrum-Griffin Amendments), Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§ 704(a), 704(e), 73 Stat. 519,
542-43, 545 (1959). Section 704(a) of the amendments added new language to § 8(b)(4),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970), making it unlawful to coerce "any person engaged in
commerce" not simply "the employees of any employer," for the purpose of bringing
about a secondary boycott. Moreover, the legislative history of the 1959 amendments
indicated that Congress intended to allow secondary persuasion. A proposed Senate bill,
S. 1384, would have prohibited an attempt by a union to "exert or attempt to exert any
economic or other coercion against, or offer any inducement to, any person engaged in
commerce " to boycott another individual or company. S. 1384 as referred, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reported in LEGISLATIVE H tsToRY, supra note 91, at 327 (emphasis
added). Congress' failure to enact this prohibition suggests that it instead decided to
permit the offering of "inducements" to neutral employers, and therefore, impliedly
was also willing to allow the mere persuasion of neutral employers.
The Court, however, found the 1959 amendments "not germane" to the issues
presented. 377 U.S. at 254 n.l. The Court in Morton may have been reluctant to rely on
the legislative history of the 1959 amendments because the secondary persuasion in-
volved in Morton occurred in 1956.
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direct secondary persuasion would disrupt the federal labor balance,
the Morton opinion relied heavily on United Brotherhood of Carpenters
Local 1976 v. NLRB." in Carpenters Local, the Court defined the scope
of the Board's authority under section 8(b)(4)(A). 94 In concluding that
the Board's authority under that section did not extend to the prohi-
bition of secondary persuasion, the Court noted that the Act prohibits
secondary boycotts only in narrowly defined circumstances. It further
noted that the Act does not preclude employers from voluntarily en-
gaging in boycotts, nor does it prohibit a union from persuading
neutral employers to engage in boycotts "so long as it refrains from
the specifically prohibited means of coercion through inducement of
employees." 95 Therefore, the Court concluded that the Act did not
include an express wholesale prohibition of secondary persuasion.
The Court further reasoned that federal labor policy required a strict
construction of the section's interdiction of specific types of secondary
activity because the Taft-Hartley amendments were, "to a marked de-
gree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong contend-
ing forces and deeply held views on .. the appropriate balance to be
struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to
" 357 U.S. 93 (1958). In Carpenters Local, a union and an employer had a "hot
cargo" agreement which provided that "workmen shall not be required to handle non-
union material." Id. at 95. The union refused to install doors manufactured by a pur-
portedly nonunion company (Paine). Id. The employer filed a charge with the Board
which found that the union had violated § 8(b)(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) in en-
couraging employees to refuse to handle Paine's doors in order to compel the employer
to cease its business relations with Paine. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 113
N.L.R.B. 1210, 1213, 36 L.R,R,M, 1478, 1479 (1955), enfd, 241 F.2d 147, 39 L.R.R.M.
2428 (9th Cir. 1957). The Court affirmed the Board's finding that the union's action
had constituted compulsion of the secondary employer in violation of section 8(b)(4)(A).
357 U.S. at 111. Furthermore, the Court concluded that "inducement of employees that
are prohibited under § 8(b)(4)(A) in the absence of a hot cargo provision are likewise
prohibited when there is such a provision." Id. at 106. The Court recognized that sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(A) did not comprise a wholesale prohibition of all secondary boycotts and
thus did not proscribe secondary boycotts where the neutral employer consents to the
boycott. Id. at 98-99. See text infra at notes 99-100. However, the Court reasoned that
the union could not immunize itself from charges of § 8(b)(4)(A) violations by contend-
ing that the employer in accepting the hot cargo clause in the contract, had voluntarily
agreed that his workers should not handle the goods. 357 U.S. at 105. instead, the
Court concluded that the freedom of choice for the employer contemplated by ft
8(b)(4)(A) was not merely the abstract freedom at the time of' contract negotiations, but
included the right to make intelligent decisions under the impact of a concrete situa-
tion. Id. at 105-06.
9 ' 357 U.S. at 98-100. Section 8(b)(4)(A), as enacted in 1947, prohibited unions
from engaging in or encouraging the employees of any employer to engage "in a strike
or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, ... any
goods, ... or commodities, or to perform any services" where an object thereof
is—"forcing or requiring ... any employer ... or other person to cease using, selling,
. , or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other person; ...." Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947). This prohibition is now incorporated in § 8(b)(4)(B),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970). Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub.
L. No. 86-257, § 704(a), 73 Stat. 519, 542 (1959).
99 357 U.S. at 98.99
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further their respective interests."9° The Carpenters Local Court, then,
did not rely on evidence in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
amendments to permit the conduct in question; it instead reasoned
from a broad conception of federal labor policy which in effect as-
sumes the allowability of economic self-help in the absence of a clear
statutory mandate for its prohibition. Thus, despite the narrow con-
cern of the Morton decision with the allowability of secondary activity
not prohibited under section 303, the reasoning of that decision and
its reliance on Carpenters Local in fact implied a broad basis for the
preemption of state regulation of federally unprohibited self-help.
II. ANALYSIS OF KEARNEY
A. Kearney and the "Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB" Approach to
Preemption
The Court in Kearney might have found that the Union's refusal
to work overtime was "arguably protected" conduct with the result
that deference to the "primary jurisdiction" of the NLRB required
preemption of state regulation. Although the Court recognized the
potential application of the primary jurisdiction approach," it termed
that analysis "largely inapplicable to the circumstances of this case" 99
and chose instead to base its decision on the "permitted activities" in-
quiry without resolving the "arguably protected" issue. This section of
the casenote will reflect briefly on the substantive questions which a
"primary jurisdiction" analysis of Kearney would have involved and on
the implications of the Court's choice of the "permitted activities"
rather than the "primary jurisdiction" approach.
In previous cases, the Board has determined that union refusals
to work overtime constitute protected conduct under the NLRA when
the overtime is voluntary. 99
 The Board appears to distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary overtime because it views a concerted re-
fusal to work involuntary overtime as an unprotected attempt by em-
ployees to "establish and impose upon the employer their own chosen
conditions of employment."'°" On the other hand, the Board appar-
ently views brief refusals to work voluntary overtime as protected con-
duct because the union refusal in that case would not constitute an at-
tempt to impose conditions of employment since "the employer had
already agreed to permit employees to decide for themselves whether
they wished to work [overtime] ...." 101
96 Id. at 99-100.
"See 427 U.S. at 152 n. 14.
" Id. at 155.
" Dow Chem. Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1152, 59 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1281 (1965).
'"° Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806, 1809-10, 1811, 35
L.R.R.M. 1305, 1306-07 (1954); Valley City Furniture Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1589,
1593.95, 35 L.R.R.M. 1265, 1265-66 (1954).
'°' Dow Chem. Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1152, 59 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1281 (1965).
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In Kearney, the Union and the Company disagreed as to whether
overtime at the Company was voluntary or mandatory."' Yet, even if
the overtime had been voluntary, the Union's refusal to work over-
time still would have been only arguably protected, and not clearly
protected in fact, in view of two factors. First, the overtime ban in
Kearney was of long duration."ts Second, there is Board precedent for
finding refusals to work overtime unprotected where it is established
that a business was geared to overtime work,'" and it was at least ar-
guable that Kearney-Trecker's operation was geared to the overtime
work of its employees. 105 In view of these factors and in view of the
voluntariness of the overtime work in Kearney, it is not clear whether
the Board, had it been presented with the issue, would have found
that Lodge 76's overtime ban constituted protected or unprotected
conduct.
The Court recognized that it might have reviewed the Board de-
cisions concerning refusals to work overtime in conjunction with the
state court's application of the "arguably protected" test,'" but stated
1 " 427 U.S. at 152 n. 14, Compare Brief for Union at 5 with Brief for Company at
2-3.
I " The refusal to work overtime began on Mardi 7, 1972 and continued until
July 23, 1972, when the new agreement became effective. 427 U.S. at 134-35,
" 4 Decision, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 464, 479, 65 L,R,R.M. 1600 (1967),
"5 See Brief for Company at 2, 15.
I" The analysis made by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was less than satisfactory
when read in light of the relevant Board precedent. That court recognized that the
Board has found refusals to work optional or voluntary overtime to he protected, see
note 99 supra, while it has found refusals to work mandatory and scheduled overtime to
he unprotected; See note 100 supra. See 67 Wis.2d at 23, 226 N.W.2d at 206, 88
L.R.R.M. at 3344. Nevertheless, the court found the overtime ban in the instant case
unprotected without determining whether overtime at the Company was in fact volun-
tary or mandatory. Id.
The court relied wholly on Prince Lithograph Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 110, 115, 83
L.R.R.M. 1654, 1654-55 (1973), which it interpreted as holding that a concerted re-
fusal to work [voluntary] overtime is not protected," 67 Wis. 2d at 23, 226 N.W.2d at
208, 88 L.R.R.M. at 3344. This was a misreading of Prince. Prince in fact. held that an
employer did not violate § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158)(5) (1970) (see note 64 supra) by
replacing an employee who had participated in a protected refusal to work overtime.
205 N.L.R.B. at 115, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1655. The determination that the union conduct
was protected was not essential to the holding, since the replacement of strikers would
not have violated § 8(a)(3) whether the overtime ban was protected or unprotected. See
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) for the principle that an
employer may replace striking employees even if their strike constitutes protected con-
duct.
Moreover, even if it had been essential for the Board in Prince to determine
whether the union overtime ban constituted protected conduct, the facts of Prince did
not warrant an inquiry into whether concerted refusals to work overtime are generally
protected, since the Board found the conduct in Prince protected on the basis of a de-
tailed clause in the union contract which permitted such refusals. 205 N.L.R.B. at 115,
110, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1654. Finally, the case which Prince cited in support of the dictum
that overtime bans constitute "unprotected activity for which an employee may be dis-
charged," id. at 115, First Nat'l Bank of Omaha, 171 N.L.R.B. 1195, 1199, 1150, 69
L.R. R. M. 1103, 1105 (1968), does not appear to support that proposition. In Omaha the
Board reasoned that past cases had found union refusals to work overtime unprotected
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that "Nil light of our disposition of the case we have no occasion to
address the issue."'" The Court's decision not to address this issue
casts doubt on the extent to which the Court still considers deference
to the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB a compelling basis for
preemption where the conduct in question, as in Kearney, is not
actually protected, but only arguably subject to Board regulation. In re-
cent years, critics on and off the Court have urged that the "arguably
protected" test tends in some cases to work injustices on
management.' 08
 Specifically, where state law is preempted because
conduct is "arguably protected," management has no way of obtaining
a Board determination of whether the conduct is protected in fact.
Thus, management is left without any remedy despite the possibility
that the union conduct is unprotected; such a result appears unneces-
sary and perhaps unfair if judged in light of "primary jurisdiction's"
major purpose, which is the avoidance of state interference with con-
duct which is (actually) protected or prohibited under federal law.
The disposition of Kearney on "primary jurisdiction" grounds
would have been susceptible to the above criticism. Preemption of
state law on the ground that the Union's overtime ban constituted
arguably protected conduct, if the ban was in fact unprotected,
would have deprived Kearney-Trecker of a remedy on no basis other
than deference to. the NLRB. In light of the widespread
reservations'°° as to whether such deference constitutes a value of
sufficient importance to justify a total deprivation of management
remedies, it is submitted that in Kearney the Court has achieved the
result it would have achieved on the basis of the "arguably" test, but
has done so by employing a rationale with a more substantial basis in
federal labor policy. Thus, Kearney signals a judicial reluctance to in-
voke the "arguably protected" preemption inquiry, and therefore may
presage an ultimate finding that the "primary jurisdiction" approach
to preemption is no longer of general application.
B. The "Permitted Activities" Line of Preemption Inquiry in Kearney
The Court in Kearney, choosing not to address the "arguably
protected" issue, instead focused on the extent to which federal labor
where the employer had warned his employees that they would be disciplined for refus-
ing to work overtime, but distinguished Dow Chemical Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1152,
59 L.R.R.M. 1279, 1281 (1965), as based on a determination that the overtime in ques-
tion was voluntary. 171 N.L.R.B. at 1150 n.6 (This portion was omitted in L.R.R.M.).
10 ' 427 U.S. at l52 n. 14.
'°" See Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees V. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
314-15 (1971) (White, J., dissenting); Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1416 v. Ariadne
Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 201 (1970) (White, J., concurring); Cox, Labor Law Preemp-
tion Revisited, 85 HA',. L. REV. 1337, 1359-63 (1972); see generally Lesnick, Preemption
Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garman, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469, - 473-78
(1972). Where, however, the Board declines jurisdiction on the grounds that a dispute
does not have a sufficiently substantial effect on interstate commerce, 14(c)(2), 29
U.S.C.	 164(c)(2) (1970), allows the states to exercise jurisdiction.
I09 See note 108 supra and sources cited therein.
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policy requires that federally unprohibited self-help be left available to
parties to labor disputes. The Court concluded that states may not
prohibit peaceful partial strike activity which is federally unprohibited
because such activity is an integral part of the collective bargaining
process."° Thus, in Kearney, the Court expressly relied on the reason-
ing on which it impliedly based the Morton opinion. While Morton
might have been read as relying on affirmative evidence that Con-
gress intended to permit secondary persuasion,'" an analysis of that
case has indicated that the Court based its inference of the allowability
of secondary persuasion primarily on its general conception of the
labor balance struck by Congress when it enacted the NLRA." 2 It is
this same conception of the federal labor balance, and the integral
role of economic self-help, on which the Court in Kearney based the
overruling of Briggs and the holding that Wisconsin was preempted
from prohibiting a union refusal to work overtime.
While the Kearney majority took the view that Morton required
the preemption of state regulation in the instant case, 13 the dissent
distinguished Morton on the ground that in Kearney there was "no
legislative expression" of an "intent to leave partial strike activity
wholly unregulated,"" 4 The dissent would have found Morton
controlling had Congress "focused on the problems presented by par-
tial strike activity, and enacted special legislation dealing with this sub-
ject matter," yet had decided not to prohibit union refusals to work
overtime. 13 However, the Kearney dissent appears to have taken
Morton at face value and viewed its holding in a somewhat mechanical
framework. Justice Stevens assumed that Morton relied on clearcut ex-
pressions of legislative intent, when, in fact, the Court there inferred
congressional intent from a coherent overall conception of federal
labor policy."° Furthermore, although the dissent indicated that it
preferred to limit preemption to cases of such "express legislative in-
tent," it appeared to be Willing to find the necessary expressions of in-
tent from speculative evidence. Thus, Justice Stevens suggested that
there would have been sufficient evidence of legislative intent to per-
mit the union conduct if Congress had "enacted special legislation
dealing with [partial strike activity], but left the form of the activity
disclosed by this record unregulated The failure to regulate
all activates which fall under the rubric "partial strike activity" would
not seem in and of itself to manifest an express intent to permit that
"" 427 U.S. at 148-51.
1 " One commentator assumed that the Morton Court relied on the 1959 amend-
ments to the NLRA for its inference of Congress' intent to permit peaceful persuasion.
Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 H ARV. L. REV. I 337, 1352 (1972). Such an assumption
appears to be without basis in the Morton opinion. See note 92 supra.
"2 See text supra at notes 90-96.
"3 427 U.S. at 145-49.
" 4 Id, at 157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Id.
16 See note 91 .supra and accompanying text.
427 U.S. at 157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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conduct not mentioned in the legislation. Justice Stevens' requirement
of "legislative expression," then, would not add to the inference of
preemptive congressional intent which was drawn by the majority
from an overall conception of federal labor policy.
In addition to relying on Morton, the Kearney Court also found
support in the view of federal policy which the Court set forth in
NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union." 8 In Insurance Agents,
white collar union employees engaged in peaceful on-the-job harass-
ment activities for the purpose of exerting pressure on an employer
during collective bargaining.'" The employer filed a complaint with
the NLRB which found that the harassing conduct constituted a per se
violation of the union's duty to bargain in good faith under section
8(b)(3).' 2 " The Court reversed the Board and held that the NLRB did
not have authority to apply a per se rule because there was no inconsis-
tency between good faith collective bargáining as envisioned by the
NLRA and a union's use of economic pressure tactics during the
course of good-faith negotiations.' 2 ' In reaching this conclusion, the
Court analyzed the legislative history of section 8(b)(3) which, in the
Court's view, indicated that Congress narrowly conceived the duty to
bargain in good faith. Specifically, the Court concluded that section
8(b)(3) was concerned only with the attitudes of the parties at the bar-
gaining table and accordingly could not be invoked to prohibit union
harassment or other activities external to the negotiations.' 22
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that allowing the Board to apply its
per se rule would have serious implications for federal labor policy be-
cause it would allow the Board wide latitude—in the guise of finding
refusals to bargain in good faith—to "regulate what economic
weapons a party might summon to its aid." 123 This latitude, the Court
reasoned, would allow the Board, contrary to the policy of the NLRA,
to influence the substantive outcome of bargaining.' 24 The Court ex-
pressed its understanding of this policy by indicating that in prohibit-
ing certain self-help tactics, Congress intended that the Board could
not brand other tactics unlawful.' 23 The rationale advanced in sup-
'' 361 U.S. 477 (1960). Kearney described the analysis of Insurance Agents as com-
ing "full bloom in the preemption area in (Morton]." 427 U.S. at 145.
"" The harassing activities included refusing to perform customary duties while
engaging in "sit-in mornings" on the job; refusing to participate in a company cam-
paign to solicit new business; reporting late at district offices on days on which agents
were scheduled to attend them; absenting themselves from special business conferences
arranged by the company; distributing leaflets to policy holders and soliciting signatures
of policyholders on petitions directed to the company; and presenting such petitions to
the company at its home office while engaging there in mass demonstrations. 361 U.S.
at 480-81.
121' Insurance Agents' I nel-Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768,770-71,41 L.R.R.M.1 I 760 177
(1957).
121
 361 U.S. at 490-91.
122 Id. at 487-88.
123 /d. at 490.
124 1d.
1 " Id. at 498.
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port of this determination was that Congress had created a "statutory
pattern," prohibiting certain economic weapons while leaving others
available to parties to labor disputes. 126 Thus, Insurance Agents
represented the view implicit in Morton that the federal labor balance
of prohibition and permissibility included all peaceful economic
weapons, and not only those with which Congress expressly concerned
itself in the NLRA. By relying on Insurance Agents, the Kearney Court
affirmed and made express the premises of Morton.
Still, the Kearney dissent suggested, 127 the Court's reliance on
Insurance Agents appeared somewhat problematic. Insurance Agents
addressed the question of the authority of the Board to find that
union partial strike activity constituted per se a refusal to bargain
under section 8(b)(3). It did not address the issue of the role of state
law. Moreover, while Insurance Agents presented a situation in which
the Board had exceeded its statutory authority,'" there was no ques-
tion but that the Wisconsin Commission in Kearney acted within its au-
thority under state law when it enjoined the union refusal to work
overtime.'" Insurance Agents, if viewed as a narrow case reaffirming
the principle that a regulatory agency may not exceed its statutory au-
thority, would not support the result which the Court reached in
Kearney.
However, Insurance Agents has a wider significance because the
Court's conclusion that the Board had exceeded its statutory authority
was based not simply on the legislative history of section 8(b)(3), but
was grounded in a general conception of federal labor policy. The
Court's central concern in Insurance Agents was that the Board, in ex-
ceeding its statutory authority, .would be restricting the availability of
economic tactics which Congress intended to leave available to unions
and management as part of the "statutory pattern" created by
Congress.'" Moreover, the Court's determination in Insurance Agents
that the Board may not disrupt the statutory pattern which Congress
created in the NLRA would be without effect if the Court at the same
time allowed states to regulate the field in such a manner as would
1 Y 6 1d. at 500.
127 427 U.S. at 158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 " Much of the language in Insurance Agents is in fact concerned with the statu-
tory authority of the NLRB, e.g.:
We think the Board's resolution of the issues here amounted not to a res-
olution of interests which the Act had left to it for case-by-case adjudica-
tion, but to a movement into a new area of regulation which Congress had
not committed to it. Where Congress has in the statute given the Board a
question to answer, the courts will giN)e respect to that answer; but they
must be sure the question has been asked. We see no indication here that
Congress has put it to the Board to define what economic sanctions
might be permitted in an 'ideal' ... state of collective bargaining.
361 U.S. at 499-500.
149 The relevant Wisconsin statute, Wis. S -rn-r. ANN. § 111.06(2) (1974) (West), is
quoted at note 12 supra.
13 " See 361 U.S. at 498-500.
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disrupt that statutory pattern."' The application of the Insurance
Agents rationale to the preemption context seems particularly compel-
ling in view of the role of the NLRB in administering the federal Act.
Because section 8 somewhat generally proscribes conduct directed at
certain ends, the Act leaves to the Board the determination whether
certain conduct is prohibited under particular circumstances. Thus,
the Board in effect gives substance to the intent of Congress to ban
particular economic weapons and bears the primary responsibility for
the effectuation of federal labor policy. 132 If restraint of partial strike
activity by the agency which effectuates and gives substance to federal
policy would disrupt the statutory pattern established in the NLRA,
state restraint of the same activity a fortiori would frustrate federal pol-
icy.
Moreover, the Kearney reasoning which analogizes from a deci-
sion that the Board may not prohibit certain conduct to support a
holding that the states are preempted from regulating the same con-
duct has precedent in Morton. The Morton decision preempting state
law from regulating direct persuasion of secondary employers was
based fundamentally on the conception of federal labor policy set
forth in Carpenters Local.'" Carpenters Local, like Insurance Agents, was a
case limiting the authority of the Board to find that particular union
conduct constituted an unfair labor practice. In both Carpenters Local
and Insurance Agents, the Court reasoned that a strict reading of the
relevant section 8 prohibition was necessary if the Board were not to
disrupt the labor balance struck by Congress.' 34
 Neither opinion re-
lied on legislative history or other express indications of Congressional
intent to permit the conduct in question but rather based its conclu-
sion on the need to maintain the "federally struck labor balance". It
appears, then, that the Kearney dissent's criticism of the Court's re-
liance on Insurance Agents overlooked the true relevance of that deci-
sion. Insurance Agents' relevance can only be understood in view of the
common basic premise underlying Insurance Agents, Morton, Carpenters
Local and Kearney: Congress' creation of a balance of permitted and
prohibited self-help, a balance which includes all peaceful union tac-
tics whether or not expressly referred to in the Act.
III. THE IMPACT OF KEARNEY
A. Direct State Curtailment of Self-Help
The basic rationale of the Kearney -Morton preemption approach
is that federal labor legislation represents a comprehensive balance of
prohibited and allowable conduct, and that state proscriptions on
See Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 HAM'. L.
REV. 641, 669 (1961).
"'See Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 499.
"'See text supra at notes 91-96.
1" See text supra at notes 93-97.
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conduct neither prohibited nor protected under the NLRA serve to
disrupt this balance. Since Kearney was not based on a finding of a
specific Congressional intent to allow union refusals to work overtime,
but rather on a more general conception of federal policy, it appears
to imply the preemption of all direct state regulation of federally un-
protected and unprohibited conduct, except where such conduct is of
only peripheral concern to the policy of the NLRA.' 35 Thus, Kearney
will in all likelihood have its most direct impact on state regulation of
activities' which are federally "permitted." Such activities include, in
addition to refusals to work overtime, other partial strike activity such
as slowdowns"" and on-the-job harassment.'" Other "permitted" ac-
tivities are the issuing in certain circumstances of statements by a
union maligning an employer's product.; 139
 the peaceful persuasion of
secondary employers;" 9
 and strikes to compel payment of a wage in-
crease prohibited by federal law. 140
In addition to its direct implications for the relatively narrow
area of "permitted activities," the Kearney
-Morton approach raises the
broader question of whether the "primary jurisdiction of the NLRB"
test as developed in Garmon' 41 is necessary to the protection of federal
labor policy against state interference. The primary jurisdiction ap-
proach is ultimately based on the premise that in determining the al-
lowability of state regulation of union conduct, it is crucial to deter-
mine whether the conduct is federally protected or prohibited.
Kearney, however, establishes in effect that states may not regulate
federally unprohibited conduct which is of more than peripheral
concern to the NLRA, since such regulation would disrupt the feder-
ally struck labor balance. Moreover, it appears that, once it is deter-
mined that the application of state law would disrupt the substantive
labor balance established by Congress, it would be unnecessary to go
further and determine whether the state action also restricts a union's
exercise of a federal right. Thus, while the Kearney holding was lim-
ited to the area of conduct assumed neither protected nor prohib-
ited, it logically requires the preemption of any federally unprohib-
ited self-help other than conduct found to be peripheral to the con-
cerns of the NLRA.
135
 Where conduct. is of only "peripheral concern" to t he NLRA, there is only a
slight danger that its regulation by the states will disrupt the federal balance. This view
is implicit in Hannah Mining v. District 2, Marine Ertg'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S.
181 (1965), discussed in note 78 supra. See generally Cox, Labor Lazo Preemption Revisited,
85 HAM'. L. Rtiv. 1337, 1364-66 (1972).
13° See Phelps Dodge Copper Prods., Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360, 368, 31 L.R.R.M.
1072, 1074-75 (1952); Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 336.39, 26 L.R.R.M. 1493,
1494-95 (1950).
17 See NLRB v. insurance Agents' Intl Union, 361 U.S. 477, 492-95 (1960).
""See NLRB v. Local 1229, International Bltd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464,
477 (1953).
"" See Local '20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964).
141 See, e.g., American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302, 1312, 14 L.R.R.M. 64, 70
(1944).
141
 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See text at note 50 supra.
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It might appear that, after Kearney, the determinative question
for preemption is whether conduct which a state seeks to regulate is
federally prohibited. However, Garner held that if conduct is federally
prohibited, states may not regulate it, since such regulation would
conflict with federal remedies and procedures.'" The Garner and
Kearney rationales would likewise account for the preemption of direct
state regulation of "arguably prohibited," as opposed to "actually pro-
hibited" conduct in the following way. if the conduct found arguably
prohibited were prohibited in fact, Garner would require preemption
of state regulation. Moreover, if the conduct were in fact unprohib-
ited, Kearney implies that direct state regulation would disrupt the
federal labor balance and is thus preempted by federal policy. Accord-
ingly, it seems that Kearney and Garner, viewed together, require the
preemption of any state law which purports directly to regulate peace-
ful union conduct which is within the area of central concern to the
NLRA. It appears, therefore, that the "primary jurisdiction of the
NLRB" test, at least as applied to such direct state regulation, is of
minimal conceptual importance to the avoidance of state interference
with federal policy.
B. • Slate Curtailment of Self-Help Through the Application of Neutral State
Laws
The second inquiry into the extent of the preemption of state
law mandated by Kearney focuses not on state laws which seek directly
to regulate the peaceful conduct of parties to a labor dispute, but
rather on the effect of neutral state laws.'" The preemption. of
"neutral" law is an area in which the various formulas which the
Court has developed have not provided clear answers. In the past, the
Court has not applied the "primary jurisdiction of the NLRB" test in
cases where it has found that the states have a compelling local con-
cern such as in policing violence 144 or where it has determined that a
case involved matters of merely "peripheral concern" to the NLRA.'"
The Court has invoked both of these exceptions to the Gannon test on
occasion to allow the application of neutral state laws to cases growing
out of labor disputes.'" At the same time, however, the Court has not
indicated that the Garmon inquiry would never operate to preempt
any "neutral" state laws. The Court, for example, has had oppor-
tunities to make such an exception for the application of state trespass
law, but so far has left that issue open."'
12 346 U.S. at 490-91.
143 For one definition of "neutral" state laws, see text at note 149 infra.
'" See note 50 supra.
' 45 See note 50 supra.
'" See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers 114, 383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966);
United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 669 (1959).
1 " See Taggart v. Weinacker's Inc., 397 U.S. 223, '226 (1971); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 24-25 (1957). See generally
Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction over Concerted Trespassory Union Activity, 83
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In Kearney, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, wrote
a separate opinion'''" which appeared to condition his concurrence on
his understanding that the majority's opinion did not preclude the en-
forcement of "neutral" state laws in the context of a labor dispute.
Justice Powell defined "neutral" laws as those "not directed toward al-
tering the bargaining positions of employers or unions but which may
have an incidental effect on relative bargaining strength"."" Justice
Powell's approach appears to imply the nonpreemption of state tres-
pass taw in cases involving picketing.
Despite Powell's concurrence, the Court might well be hesitant to
hold that federal labor policy generally allows state trespass actions
arising out of picketing. Just as the outer limits of the application of
the "peripheral concern" and "state interest" exceptions to the Garman
"arguably" rule are unclear, so are the outer limits of Justice Powell's
"neutral laws" category. The concept that a law be "directed toward"
altering bargaining positions should not imply that such a directed-
ness necessarily be clear upon the' face of the law. A law, neutral on
its face, may in its application he directed toward an altering of bar-
gaining positions; 15" a court may apply state trespass law to a picket-
ing situation as a means of - institut[ing] ground rules governing the
economic struggle between the union"' and the employer.' 5 ' In such a
case the effect on relative bargaining power would not be "incidental."
It thus appears that the Court should not give the neutrality on its
face of a law talismanic significance but should also look at the context
of its application. Such an approach is consistent with the tone of the
Court's opinion in Kearney. In determining whether state regulation
frustrated the processes of the NLRA, the Court considered the moti-
vation of the party invoking the regulation.'" In Kearney itself the
application of the law was so clearly directed at the federal labor bal-
ance that the Company's motivation was probably not of controlling
11 A RV. L. REV. 552, 562-68 (1970). The state courts are divided on whether Federal
policy requires the preemption of stale jurisdiction over trespass cases arising out of
union picketing. For cases holding the state preempted, see Sears, Roebuck & Co, v,
San Diego County Dist. Council Carpenters, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443, 453, 553 P.2d 603,
613, 93 L.R.R.M. 2161, 2167 (1976), cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3582 (1977); Freeman v.
Retail Clerks Local 1207, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 434, 363 I'.2d 803, 807, 48 L.R.R.M, 2835,
2837 (1961) (concurring opinion). Contra, Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employers
Local 444, l6 Wis. 2d 499, 503, 114 N,W.2d 876, 878, 50 L.R.R.M. 2092, 2093 (1962);
People v. Goduio, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 611-12, 174 N.E.2d 385, 388, 48 L.R.R.M, 2126, 2128,
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
14 " 427 U.S. at 155-56 (Powell, J., concurring).
"ft Id.
's" "Decisional rules developed as particular applications of general tort princi-
ples are [according to Cox's proposed test] likewise preempted because particular appli-
cation results from weighing the competing interests in a labor dispute ...." Cox, Labor
Law Preemption Revisited, 85 14Agv, L. REV, 1337, 1356 (1972).
"'Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 132 Cal. Rptr.
443, 451, 553 P.2d 603, 611, 93 L.R.R.M. 2161, 2166 (1976), cert. grnnted, 45 U.S.L.W.
3582 (1977), quoting Musicians Local 6 v. Superior Court, 69 Ca1.2d 695, 712, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 212, 447 P.2d 313, 324, 69 L.R.R.M. 2803, 2810 (1968).
152 427 U.S. at 148-49.
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importance. However, the mention of such a factor is consistent with
the view that, in looking at the application of a "neutral" state law,
the Court would not inflexibly assume that federal policy does not
preempt the state action.
CONCLUSION
Kearney has left open the question whether the Court will subse-
quently overrule the "primary jurisdiction of the NLRB" approach to
preemption. For the present, state courts probably will continue to
apply the primary jurisdiction approach because the Supreme Court
has given them no express directive to the contrary; because the ap-
proach usually yields "correct" results; 133 and because the courts are
accustomed to applying that approach. Nevertheless, it is clear that
the Kearney rationale has put in question the doctrinal vitality of the
Garman primary jurisdiction inquiry. More generally, the Court has
resolved the doubt left by Briggs as to the scope of the federally struck
labor balance, and has indicated in effect that the federal balance in-
cludes all peaceful self-help which is not clearly peripheral to the con-
cerns of the NLRA. In overruling Briggs the Court has expressly ap-
plied to preemption the comprehensive view of the federal labor
scheme which was implicit in past "permitted activities" preemption
cases.
MITCHELL S. PRESSMAN
Labor Law—Boys Markets Injunction—Sympathy Strike—Ac-
commodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act—Buffalo Forge Co.
v. United Steelworkers.'
The United Steelworkers of America (the Union) and two of its
locals were certified to represent office and clerical-technical em-
ployees in negotiating their first collective bargaining agreement with
the Buffalo Forge Company. When negotiations broke down, these
employees struck the company and established picket lines at three
separate plant and office facilities in the Buffalo, New York area. 2
Two days later the production and maintenance employees, also rep-
resented by the United Steelworkers, refused to cross the office em-
ployees' picket lines at one of the company's plants. 3 Shortly thereafter,
"3 See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV, L. REV, 1337, 1359 (1972).
Hy "correct" results are meant results consistent with the view that the states may not
regulate labor so as to disrupt the federally struck labor balance.
'	 U.S._, 96 S. Ct. 3141 (1976).
'Id. at 3143-44.
'Id. at 3144. Throughout this note the terms refusal to cross a picket line, sym-
pathy strike; and honoring a sister union's picket line will be used interchangeably. A
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